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Endorsers, Challengers of Builders? Political Parties’ Diaspora Outreach in a 
Postconflict State  
Abstract 
How do parties in government and opposition in a contested postconflict state 
reach out to their diasporas abroad? Do their policies overlap or differ, and if so why? 
Scholarly accounts on sending states’ outreach towards diasporas have paid little 
attention to the varieties of actors and processes within sending states, and have 
grouped states with contested sovereignty, with weak control over domestic institutions 
and over contested international borders, in the same cluster as states for which 
sovereignty is not a salient issue. This article focuses on transnational party engagement 
of diasporas abroad within one of these contested states, Kosovo. I conceptualize three 
types of extraterritorial party outreach—state-endorsing, state-challenging, and party-building—
pursued actively or passively. I also develop a typological theory showing causal 
pathways by which types of diaspora engagement approaches emerged in post-
independence Kosovo. I argue that parties that emerge from political movements with 
credentials from engagement with secessionism and warfare behave like parties in fully 
sovereign states. They are more likely to seek the diaspora through a state-endorsing or 
party-building approach, depending on whether they are in government or opposition. 
Parties that are newly institutionalized in the postconflict polity seek to engage the 
diaspora through an active state-endorsing or state-challenging approach.  
Keywords: sending state, diaspora, country of origin, migration, post-conflict 
reconstruction, parties, contested sovereignty, government, opposition, secessionism, 
Kosovo, UK, US, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland. 
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Introduction 
Scholarship on the engagement of sending states with diasporas abroad has 
grown during the past decade, reflecting an expanding understanding that diasporas 
remain connected to their countries of origin, even if permanently relocating to host-
societies. Some sending states are more active than others to discern potential benefit 
from diasporas, beyond cherished remittances (up to 15% of GDP in some weak states) 
(World Bank 2015). Scholars started exploring such cross-country variations (Delano 
and Gamlen 2014, Ragazzi 2014). As the introduction to this special issue shows, they 
have paid less attention to varieties of actors and processes within sending states, which 
can converge and diverge under different conditions, in different states and regimes. 
Scholarly accounts have often grouped states with contested sovereignty, with weak 
control over domestic institutions and agents or contested borders, in the same cluster 
as states for which sovereignty is not a salient issue.  
This article focuses specifically on states with contested sovereignty and asks: 
how do parties in government and opposition in a contested postconflict state reach 
out to their diasporas? Do their policies overlap or differ, and if so why? These are 
important questions, as states with limited sovereignty have increased since the Cold 
War ended. An impressive number of de facto states emerged across the globe: Kosovo, 
Palestine, Somaliland, Sahrawi Republic, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
Transnistria, Chechnya, Taiwan, and others. Other contested states with 
internationally delineated borders, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia, are deeply divided on ethnonationalist or sectarian grounds. Diasporas 
have also been instrumental in developing secessionist movements, among them the 
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Kurdish diaspora in the Middle East and the Tamil and Sikh diasporas in Asia. Many 
of these recently created states are a result of break-up of former empires or 
decolonization acquired through resistance, revolutions or warfare. 
This article focuses on transnational party engagement of diasporas abroad 
within one of these contested states, Kosovo. In response to the first question, I 
conceptualize three types of extraterritorial party outreach—state-endorsing, state-
challenging, and party-building—pursued actively or passively. As to the second, I develop a 
typological theory showing causal pathways by which types of diaspora engagement 
approaches emerged in post-independence Kosovo. I argue that parties that emerge 
from political movements with credentials from engagement with secessionism and 
warfare behave like parties in fully sovereign states. They are more likely to seek the 
diaspora through a state-endorsing or party-building approach, depending on whether they 
are in government or opposition. Parties that are newly institutionalized in the 
postconflict polity seek to engage the diaspora through an active state-endorsing or state-
challenging approach.  
The article engages two clusters of explanations, currently not in conversation 
but providing valuable insights to these central questions. I first discuss the scarce 
scholarship on governmental and party political engagement with diasporas abroad; 
review literature specifically related to diasporas and conflict and postconflict polities; 
and present my methodology and a brief overview of Kosovo’s secessionism and the 
role of the diaspora in it. The three conceptual types are developed, followed by a 
typological theory argument, and venturing into the diaspora politics of four major 
parties in Kosovo in 2013, when the fieldwork was conducted. The conclusions explore 
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extrapolating the findings to other polities experiencing contested sovereignty and their 
diaspora engagement.  
Relationships of Governments and Parties with Diasporas Abroad 
The emerging literature on the extraterritorial engagement of diaspora abroad 
focuses primarily on the sending state. As the introductory article discusses in more 
detail, sending states are driven by a utilitarian rationale, considering the diasporas’ 
material power through remittances, direct investment, diaspora bonds, philanthropy, 
and tourism (Gamlen 2014); an identity-based rationale through symbolic connections to 
maintain the homeland culture abroad (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, author 2016); 
a governance rationale to exert influence on the diaspora through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, with a “light managerial approach” characteristic of a neoliberal 
global political order (Waterbury 2010, Delano and Gamlen 2014, Ragazzi 2014); and a 
sociopositional rationale demonstrating how sending states factor positionality of 
diasporas in different sociospatial contexts across the globe (Koinova 2018, see also 
Tsourapas 2015).  
The state is primarily analyzed through an institutional approach, where state 
institutions relate to diasporas to develop, sustain, or resist extraterritorial linkages to 
domestic processes: allowing or restricting dual citizenship (Mirilovic 2015), building 
diaspora ministries and agencies (Gamlen 2014), external voting (Collyer 2014, Lafleur 
2015, Paalberg 2017), and others.  
Accounts concerned with understanding specifically the role of governments or 
parties are much more limited. Governments have often been analyzed indiscriminately 
as stewards of institutional processes, and parties in terms of narrow electoral 
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competition. Some accounts have shown that governments may change attitudes 
towards dual citizenship in domestic political reforms, especially related to 
democratization and international norm externalization (Lafleur 2015). The Mexican 
government in the 1980s, interested in opening the global economy and joining 
NAFTA, became eager to reconsider its distant relationship with the US-based 
diaspora, needed to lobby the US Congress (Lafleur 2011). In another example, 
authorities in Turkey were largely reactive to diaspora politics in the early 2000s 
(Oestergaard-Nielsen 2003). Yet, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the diaspora was quickly considered an enfranchised 
electoral block, sought after in electoral campaigns and the recent 2017 constitutional 
referendum. 
Growing interest in diaspora voting has started highlighting the role of parties 
across borders. A large number of 115 democratic and nondemocratic states allow 
some form of diaspora voting from abroad (Collyer and Vathi 2007). In 13 states 
diasporas can vote for their own representatives in national assemblies through special 
representation, from reserving 1 seat for the diaspora in Colombia to 12 in Italy to 18 
in Tunisia (Collyer 2014). Parties are more engaged with emigration issues when they 
have strong electoral incentives within systems allowing diasporas special representation 
(Oestergaard-Nielsen and Ciorney 2017). Yet the assumption that party politics abroad 
is a mere extension of domestic institutions and political affairs is incorrect (Paalberg 
2017). Diaspora party politics vary across parties, and can depend on linkages between 
parties and diaspora segments. Mexico’s restrictive diaspora politics until the 1980s 
started changing with the advent of a new left-wing party, Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática (PRD), with strong links to US-based emigrant activists (Santamaría 
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Gómez 1994, quoted in Lafleur 2011). Parties ideologically aligned with the majority in 
the diaspora, as in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, could be more interested in 
campaigning abroad (Lieber 2010). Nationalist parties could have a stronghold in the 
diaspora compared to others, as with the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (Brkanic 
2016) and the Macedonian VMRO-DMPNE (author 2010). Minority parties can also 
foster voting from abroad, as the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms in 
Bulgaria, which engages ethnic Turks who emigrated from Bulgaria primarily since the 
end of communism (Koinova 2013a). As Paalberg argues, diasporas are valuable 
constituencies, important as potential “direct” voters and as agents of indirect influence 
over homeland-based families, or of financial help for political campaigns (2017). 
Discussion about governments and parties engaging diasporas is in inception 
and not circumspect about two aspects important for this study. First, besides 
acknowledging that refugees need to be considered stakeholders in external voting in 
postconflict societies – such as Kosovo, East Timor, Eritrea, Rwanda, Liberia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq – to avoid legitimization of displacement as a goal of war (Collyer 
2014), there is no explicit interest in considering postconflict societies. In such societies 
parties often emerge from previous wartime formations, which have drawn support 
from the diaspora and participated in negotiated settlements during peace processes 
and demobilization of combatants. This process shapes political dynamics with the 
diaspora, and points to legacies of wartime periods. Second, even with ideological 
alignments between local agents and diasporas, little is known about how parties 
connect nationalism and postconflict statehood when engaging the diaspora. This 
article demonstrates that parties in government or opposition in a postconflict state do 
not view the diaspora in a uniform way, when making claims about the relationship 
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between nation and state.  
This article also serves as a bridge between literature on sending states and 
scholarship on the role of diasporas in conflict and postconflict reconstruction, which 
evolved separately since the 2000s. The literature points out that diasporas began 
playing an important role in a world defined by intra- rather than interstate conflicts 
after the Cold War. Conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Rwanda, Kosovo, 
Croatia, Eritrea, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia, and Palestine among others have drawn 
resources from their diasporas. An influential World Bank study showed that 
reconstruction polities with strong involvement with US-based diasporas are more likely 
to perpetuate domestic conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Conflict-generated 
diasporas are especially prone to maintain conflicts from abroad due to ‘long-distance 
nationalism’ (Anderson 2006), traumatic identities embedded in diaspora institutions 
(Shain 2002) that could become entrenched in a relationship between diaspora, host-
state, and home-state (Koinova 2016). Diasporas could become conflict entrepreneurs 
(Brinkerhoff 2011), take up arms from abroad (Hockenos 2003), and lobby for 
secessionism and contentious political causes (author 2013). Some accounts also show 
diaspora engagement with transitional justice processes during postconflict 
reconstruction. 
The focus of this literature has been on diasporas as non-state actors affecting 
homelands experiencing conflicts, rather than on agents seeking the diaspora from 
within the sending state. Some accounts have shown that secessionist movements were 
especially prone to reach out to the diaspora, as from Kosovo (Koinova 2013b), Croatia 
(Brkanic 2016), Chechnya (author 2011), Ethiopia (Lyons 2006), the secessionist Tamil 
movement in Sri Lanka (Orjuela 2008), and others. Their focus has been primarily on 
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whether diasporas are ‘peace-makers or peace-wreckers’ (Smith and Stares 2007, Orjuela 
2008), with little attention on how secessionist movements engage them. In line with 
the special issue in diaspora engagement by agents within sending states, some of these 
accounts have demonstrated variations. Some secessionist groups pursued moderate or 
radical politics in diaspora circles, as in Kosovo (Hockenos 2003). Some parties sought 
the diaspora primarily on a sectarian basis. Diaspora parties in exile could be barred 
from the home-state, but re-embedded in it during political transitions, as in Armenia, 
and Lebanon. Pulling theoretical insights from literatures on both sending states and 
diasporas as non-state actors, this article seeks to shift thinking about diaspora 
engagement and postconflict polities.  
 
Methods and Data 
This article uses the comparative case study method on transnational diaspora 
policies of several parties within a sending state. Kosovo as a de facto state, where local 
governance and institutions exist but the state is not fully recognized internationally, 
serves as a unit of analysis from within a universe of postconflict polities. Four parties 
in positions of government and opposition serve as the actual cases. Gerring notes, ‘a 
unit [of analysis] connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-state, 
revolution, political party, election, or person—observed at a single point in time or over 
some delimited period of time… A country may function as a case, a unit, a population, 
or a case study… [since these terms] are nested within each other’ (2007:341). In this 
research design, transnational policies of different parties within the sending state are 
subject to structured focused comparison (George and Bennett 2004). 
A methodological challenge emerges when analyzing diaspora relations, since 
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parties’ activities are not spatially confined to a certain territory. Parties are usually 
defined as entities channeling electoral politics, with ideologically similar foundations, 
a body of notables or mass of supporters that command electoral loyalties (Katz and 
Crotty 2006), and ‘central intermediate structures between government and civil 
society’ (Sartori 1976). Such definitions do not consider the parties’ transnationalized 
nature, since parties can have headquarters in the sending state and viable branches 
abroad, exist in exile only, or be based both home and abroad. Comparative studies of 
transnationalized parties must go beyond what Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) call 
‘methodological nationalism.’ The data collection in this study reflects such a 
transnational mind-frame, as research was conducted in a multi-sited manner, recently 
accepted in migration research, but still a novelty in political science.  
This paper uses empirical data from more than 60 semistructured interviews, 
conducted in Kosovo in summer 2013, and the UK, Netherlands, Germany, and 
Sweden in 2013-2016. I conducted interviews with representatives of Kosovo 
government agencies (15), parties (8), NGOs (12), international organizations (5), and 
diaspora entrepreneurs (20) who remain anonymous as per requirements for ethical 
research. I also build on published research on mobilization of the Kosovo diaspora in 
the US, and on secondary resources related to mobilization in an important country for 
the Kosovo diaspora, Switzerland. I conducted participant observation of events in 
Kosovo in 2013 related to the ‘Diaspora Days,’ diaspora women business 
entrepreneurship, and others. Interviewees belong to the category ‘diaspora 
entrepreneurs,’ formal or informal activists who make claims for their homelands or 
engage diasporas in such claim-making. Interviewees were selected through snowball 
sampling, and public sources. The empirical material was analyzed through ‘grounded 
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coding,’ inductively developing meaningful categories to analyze subsections of texts, 
clustering them within a larger data corpus (Saldana 2013).  
 
Evolution of Kosovo’s Contested Statehood in Relationship to the Diaspora 
Historically, Kosovo and other areas inhabited by Albanians in the Balkans – at 
present in Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and others – were not included in the state 
of Albania formed in 1913 during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which 
remains a source of contention with these countries until the present (Pettifer and 
Vickers 2009). After World War I Kosovo was integrated into the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, and after World War II into the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), acquiring an autonomous status. The end of communism and SFRY’s 
disintegration in the late 1980s opened space for Kosovo’s secessionism. In 1991 the 
newly formed Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) declared independence from 
Serbia. Segregated from public institutions, schools, jobs, and medical care, many 
Kosovo Albanians were forced or chose to migrate. Pursuing non-violent resistance, the 
LDK built a network of party branches, including Europe, US, Australia, Turkey, and 
others (Hockenos 2003). Violence escalated in 1998, when large parts of the diaspora 
started being more supportive of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), advocating radical 
actions to achieve state independence. The diaspora fundraised, sponsored warfare, and 
sent fighters to the Kosovo battlefields (Hockenos 2003). Its importance subsided after 
the 1999 NATO military intervention, when diaspora members withdrew to take care 
of private concerns, or rebuild houses and infrastructure in wartorn Kosovo (Koinova 
2013b).   
Currently, Kosovo is a de facto state with predominantly Albanian ethnicity, and 
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Serb, Turkish, Bosnian, and Roma minorities living on its territory. In 2008 Kosovo 
elites declared independence, supported by the US, major EU countries, but not Russia 
and China. To date, Kosovo has received 113 diplomatic recognitions, but not full 
international sovereignty or UN recognition. Nevertheless, domestic sovereignty has 
largely been present, with institutions and parties built under the UN Mission of 
Kosovo (UNMIK) in collaboration with the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, and other international organizations.  
Kosovo’s 2008 independence reinvigorated the diaspora in new ways, as 
officially sanctioned state institutions and parties, not secessionist formations, reached 
out. Three years after independence, in 2011, a Ministry of Diaspora emerged from the 
Agency for the Diaspora, and a National Strategy and Action Plan on Migration were 
developed (World Bank 2011). With support from the International Organization of 
Migration, Finland, and UNDP, intense consultation took place among 900 Kosovar 
diaspora members in 13 countries, aiding development of a Diaspora Strategy (R1, 
2013, Diaspora Strategy 2013).1 
 
Four Transnationalized Kosovo Parties in Government and Opposition 
Kosovo parties have no real experience with functioning in a stable party 
system. They are part of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) call an‘inchoate party system’ 
with few institutionalized party platforms or consolidated ideologies, predominantly 
driven by personalities. At the time of my 2013 fieldwork all parties had parliamentary 
representatives, but had different experiences governing Kosovo, primarily in coalition 
governments, after the first postwar parliamentary elections in 2001. Between 2001 and 
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2013: 1) the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) was in government between 2001-2004, 
in opposition between 2004 and 2007, and again in government since 2007; 2) The 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was part of all coalition governments until 2010, 
then in opposition until 2014; 3) The New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) was in opposition 
between 2007-2010 and in government at the time of fieldwork, until 2014; 4) 
Vetevendosje (Self-determination) participated for the first time in parliamentary 
elections in 2010, and remained in opposition.2 The constellation of parties studied 
during 2013 fieldwork is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
The leading coalition partner in government was the Democratic Party of Kosovo 
(PDK), the largest party after the war. Emerging after the demilitarization of KLA, it was 
continuously headed by former KLA commander Hashim Thaci, currently president, 
and has roots in Marxist-Leninist circles of the People’s Movement of Kosovo, whose 
membership since the 1980s and support came from the diaspora, especially 
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Switzerland. The PDK, currently a center-right party (Koha 2013), was in government 
between 2010 and 2014, in coalition with the more recent New Kosovo Alliance 
(AKR), a liberal political party of wealthy Kosovo-Swiss businessman Behgjet Pacolli, 
alongside several smaller parties. Pacolli acted as First Deputy Prime Minister. He was 
elected president by the Parliamentary Assembly in 2011, but demoted by a 
Constitutional Court decision over electoral irregularities (Balkan Insight 2011). 
Pacolli’s earlier generous support for lobbyists in Washington D.C (Koinova 2013b) 
made him important to lobby for further recognition of Kosovo’s independence.  
Currently more than thirty parties operate in Kosovo, among them ethnic 
minority parties. I chose to study two influential parties in opposition, the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Self-determination Party Vetevendosje. The LDK is the 
second-biggest party, successor of the eponymous movement that in the 1990s was at 
the helm of Kosovo’s shadow state. It started as a nationalist movement, moved to the 
political center in the 2000s, and is currently considered social conservative. 
Vetevendosje emerged from a student movement under the leadership of Albin Kurti, 
which in the mid-1990s considered LDK’s rule ‘a movement of sitting’ (quoted in 
Koinova 2013a), and mobilized students in support of then-rising KLA. Unlike the 
LDK or PDK, Vetevendosje was not actively engaged in building institutions during the 
2000s. It presented the most critical opposition to UNMIK and respective governments 
during the 2000s, supported Kosovo’s unconditional self-determination from both 
Serbia and international organizations, and used boycotts and other transgressive 
means to pursue its goals. Currently Vetevendosje is the most outspoken on the 
nationalist spectrum; it challenges government negotiations with Serbia, openly 
supports ‘greater Albania,’ and campaigns for turning Kosovo into a developmental 
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state with welfare state characteristics, to be governed by meritocracy, not nepotism.  
Even if physically registered in Kosovo, these parties have been highly 
transnationalized from their inception and over time. This has taken place by 
personalities pursuing Kosovo’s independence and the networks and structures they 
built domestically and abroad. Thaci (PDK) launched his nationalist activities from 
Switzerland and moved to Kosovo only after the war. Pacolli (AKR) could be 
considered a high caliber circular migrant, as he currently shuttles between Switzerland 
and Kosovo. Minister of Foreign Affairs Enver Hoxhaj lived in Austria, as did Deputy 
Minister of Energy and Mining Blerim Rexha.  High-ranking employees of the Diaspora 
Ministry have also lived abroad. Rugova (LDK) did not live outside Kosovo, but current 
LDK party leader Isa Mustafa was a Financial Minister of the 1990s parallel 
government in Bonn. Kurti (Vetevendosje) did not live abroad, but the majority of his 
current team are returnees from the UK and Switzerland. Many regular party and 
parliament members are also diaspora returnees (R2, 2013; R3, 2013).3  
 
Explaining Different Types of Diaspora Outreach 
This article brings two new ways of theorizing about sending state outreach 
toward diasporas: developing conceptual types of outreach of agents within the sending 
state, and explaining their emergence through typological theorizing. There are three 
types of diaspora outreach by parties in government and opposition in a postconflict 
polity: state-endorsing, state-challenging, and party-building. A state-endorsing approach 
engages the diaspora to support the existing political order and institutions, seeking 
financial contributions, lobbying, promoting cultural identity, public diplomacy, and 
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considering return in support of these institutions, among others. A state-challenging 
approach engages the diaspora in supporting reconfiguration of state fundamentals, 
territorial borders, or economic and social order. This approach challenges the 
domestic or international sovereignty of the postconflict polity. A party-building 
approach is mostly agnostic about statehood, but seeks the diaspora for party-building 
purposes and leverage in its electoral competition. These approaches can be pursued 
actively or passively. 
Second, specifically regarding the Kosovo case, the causal pathways that led to 
these types of extraterritorial party engagement can be explained by factoring the 
position of a party in government or opposition and two conjunctural variables: the 
party’s credentials from warfare and the secessionist period, and prior participation in the 
building of state institutions during postconflict reconstruction. Typological theorizing, by 
contrast to simple conceptual development of types, explicates the causal pathways by 
which certain types of phenomena emerge (George and Bennett 2004). Figure 2 
demonstrates the typological argument; the text further discusses the empirics in depth. 
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Diaspora Outreach of the Coalition Government 
In 2013 Kosovo’s government pursued an entirely state-endorsing approach, to 
rebuild connections with the diaspora for state-endorsing purposes. A high ranking 
Ministry of Diaspora official argued: ‘we encourage them to integrate… to be involved 
in the political, public, academic, cultural, sport life of the countries they live in. We 
also support them to maintain their identity with the full study of Albanian’ (R2, 
2013). The Diaspora Strategy, adopted in 2013 during the coalition government 
mandate, the most comprehensive document guiding its functions., outlined major 
lines of engagement such as: financial investment, education, and public diplomacy.  
Regarding financial investment, the Diaspora Ministry identified 500 diaspora 
entrepreneurs interested in investing primarily in small businesses, with limited interest 
in larger entrepreneurs in the construction and agricultural sectors (R4, 2013).4 The 
US, Switzerland, and Germany were targeted as important destinations, not least 
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because the diaspora is numerically significant there (Koinova 2018). Of major interest 
was a diaspora business network, which took off in the second half of the government’s 
term. The Diaspora Ministry, international organizations, and active diaspora branches 
became part of a transnational Kosovo Albanian project, ‘Diaspora Engagement and 
Economic Development’ (DEED 2016). The Diaspora Ministry also promoted a 
Women’s Business Network among Albanian women in distant countries and 
neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, and served as a broker between 
municipalities and potential investors, identifying land to be leased for investment 
purposes (R3, 2013). It developed a comprehensive network of diaspora support 
officers in municipalities, tasking them to aid diaspora with information and 
documentation, and build a register of diaspora representatives who migrated from 
each municipality (R2, 2013).  
Kosovo’s government took a leadership role to develop an education curriculum 
for mother-tongue education of Albanian students abroad, surpassing the usual 
leadership of kin-state Albania. While Kosovo diaspora members in Switzerland gave 
impetus to this initiative, expertise was also solicited from diaspora members in 
Sweden. Sweden, which has officially sponsored mother-tongue education of minority 
populations, fostered the Kosovo diaspora to develop state-sponsored Albanian-
language teaching expertise (Koinova 2018). Some diaspora members considered the 
government of little influence on diaspora affairs in Sweden (R5, 2014),5 but expertise 
for education has been important for the government (R6, 2013).6  
The Kosovo government also launched a concerted effort to engage the diaspora 
in a twofold manner. One was an official strategy of public diplomacy, advertised 
through the Foreign Ministry (2016). Public diplomacy has been necessary to show the 
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good side of Kosovo Albanians, overshadowed by media reports on criminality, 
unemployment (Xharra and Waehlish 2012), and renewed asylum seeking, and go 
hand in hand with “digital” diplomacy, to reinforce public engagement through social 
media and other online platforms (R7, 2013).7  It often sought to emphasize the 
uniquely youthful population of Kosovars in an ageing Europe. The government 
connected to educated publics in the UK, and promoted UK pop star Rita Ora as an 
honorary ambassador, and successful sport-related individuals in Switzerland and 
Germany (Xharra and Waehlish 2012, author 2014). Public diplomacy efforts inspired 
diaspora activists abroad, directly or indirectly. For instance, a diaspora activist in 
Germany began actively raising public awareness of Mother Teresa’s charitable work 
and Albanian heritage, emphasizing that Albanians could be Catholic, not only Muslim 
(R8, 2015).8  
The government sought to project an image of a united democratic Kosovo, 
worthy of joining the European family. Building an Albanian space in the Balkans –  
Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro – has been advertised as developing 
European regionalism through business cooperation. Albanians from the region and 
diaspora are encouraged to create business networks, as the examples of DEED and the 
women’s network indicate. The government officially sought to advertise Kosovo 
through its new flag, with yellow stars on a blue background, resembling the EU flag. 
The new flag, though widely considered among Kosovars as imposed by international 
powers, is used to advertise further state recognition. In the words of a respondent, 
‘some successful celebrities publicize Kosovo by showing the flag, and perhaps ask 
countries which have not yet recognized Kosovo, to do so’ (R9, 2013). 9  This 
nevertheless contravenes wide practice at home and abroad to use the flag of Albania 
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proper for identification. Diaspora members travel extensively to Kosovo to celebrate 
‘national flag day,’ November 28, when Albania declared independence from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1912, and on 17 February, when Kosovo declared independence 
from Serbia in 2008 (R10, 2013).10  
Public diplomacy was also pursued through unofficial yet widely practiced 
staffing of embassies with former activists and diaspora elites from the country in which 
the new embassies and consulates were embedded. Countless examples in the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland have been so engaged (R11, 
2015).11 The ambassador may not be hired from within the diaspora community, but 
councilors and advisors often are. An official argues: ‘often the meetings [the Minister 
of Diaspora has] with politicians from different places in Europe are arranged through 
the diaspora. These could be mayors of municipalities or others’ (R2, 2013). This 
approach brought much-needed local expertise, but also reinforced wartime and 
clientelist networks. An opposition politician argues that such staffing happens as 
‘human nature’, hiring people one knows. Diaspora individuals may also return to 
Kosovo to bring their expertise; they ‘end up being part of the foreign service as 
ambassadors and staff’, and eventually ‘party militants’ abroad (R10, 2013).  
 Minister of Diaspora Ibrahim Makolli initiated a motion to open the political 
system for up to five seats for diaspora members in parliament, in line with growing 
trends for diaspora special representation. A Ministry of Diaspora official put it:  
‘The diaspora helped a lot before the war and after the war. They have shared 
their bread with the people of Kosovo… We want to change the laws to get them seats 
in parliament… We have a lot of diaspora, but we do not have anyone responsible for 
it, only the Ministry of the Diaspora. But this is nothing. We as a Ministry have very 
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little budget, and the diaspora needs more’ (R3, 2013). 
Despite wide solicitation among diaspora members (R2, 2013) and an official 
proposition submitted to the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Changes, 
this initiative did not succeed. Parliament opposition criticized it because of a need ‘to 
have the diaspora represented in the government, rather than the government 
represented in the diaspora,’ and because voting procedures for diasporas from abroad 
need to be significantly improved (Albinfo 24/10/2011). Even if external voting is 
legally possible for Kosovo citizens abroad, the process of obtaining ballots is onerous, 
as international mail must be exchanged three times in one month. Of the considered 
300,000–400,000 eligible external voters, only 3,500 were registered for the 2014 
general elections (Freda 2014).  
Divergence in stances on special representation between the coalition partners 
demonstrates how actively or passively eager they were to engage the diaspora in a state-
endorsing approach. Pacolli’s smaller AKR party with Makolli as Minister of Diaspora at 
the helm was much more active than the more established PDK. As a PDK official 
argues, his party, at the core of the 1990s struggle and helping build local institutions 
under UNMIK during the 2000s, maintains a sentiment that ‘Kosovars have to help 
themselves on their own’. If the diaspora wants to come to Kosovo, it is highly 
welcome. The PDK claim is that ‘we are not going there’ apart from showing diaspora 
members the potential opportunities to invest and connect to Kosovo: ‘you need to 
come here’. The official also argued there is no need to exhaust the diaspora, an 
important asset for the country, or divide it into supporters for ‘LDK, PDK or whoever 
else’, since ‘this is the Kosovo diaspora’ (R11, 2013).  
The AKR party, a newcomer to postconflict Kosovo political institutions, was 
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more proactive in its diaspora orientation, seeking to engage it in statehood recognition 
during the research period, especially linking business with state recognition. A high 
AKR functionary commented:  
‘All the activity of the President of our party [Pacolli] within the government has 
been focused on creating a positive image of Kosovo and the lobbying for recognizing 
Kosovo’s independence. Usually, he has made trips in countries whose governments 
have not recognized Kosovo, and where Kosovar citizens are not able to travel, because 
they do not have documents. This includes Asian states, African states. Of course, the 
[party] President has the ability to travel to these states, but also the authority because 
of doing business… Mr. Pacolli gets on more easily with the authorities of these 
countries because of his business credentials rather than as a minister of an unknown 
country’ (R12, 2013).12 
According to this respondent, the AKR also envisaged a law on public-private 
partnerships to coordinate business activities from Kosovo and abroad. Through a 
public-private institution, a diaspora businessman could potentially obtain information 
and contacts from one ministry, not many different sources. Despite no diaspora-
related party infrastructure, the AKR developed a central branch in Zurich, which 
keeps in contact with Germany, Belgium, Canada, and US. A branch with around 20 
businessmen gets to meet Pacolli, Makkoli, and others (R12, 2013). 
Diaspora Outreach of Opposition Parties 
The LDK was one of the major parties in the postwar institution-building 
process. During the UNMIK rule, the LDK had command of presidential, 
parliamentary, and local power, often in competition with the other large party, PDK. 
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LDK maintained a parallel state in the US, Europe, and Australia diaspora, and created 
cadres of good organizers, lobbyists, and network facilitators. Some diaspora members 
changed party allegiances over time, or returned to Kosovo after the war, but many first 
generation activists continued living in their host-lands: integrated, but remaining 
passively or actively involved with the LDK. Some LDK-based networks, for example, 
the National Albanian American Council in Washington DC, have been active in 
lobbying for Kosovo’s independence until 2008 (Koinova 2013b).  
Being in opposition made the party rethink priorities and focus on a party-
building approach of diaspora engagement, to a certain degree agnostic of statehood, but 
focused on the party. A high-ranking LDK official observed:  
‘This is the first time the LDK is not in power. We chose deliberately to be in 
opposition, because we needed time to reflect and reform ourselves…. Because, each 
time being in government means that we have less time for the party…. You can have 
everybody on board when you act on behalf of an institution. But being in opposition 
makes it a bit difficult to go abroad and offer something to the entire diaspora, because 
you are not in power. Being in opposition, we are concentrating more on our branches 
and on our people. This does not mean that next time when we lead the government, 
we will not use institutional channels to reach out to the diaspora’ (R13, 2013).13 
In line with its oppositional strategy, the LDK has focused on engaging diaspora 
members in several ways. In an official’s words, one way is to involve branches in 
upcoming electoral competitions – primarily Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, 
and the US – which ‘started reengaging because they see LDK is preparing to gain 
power again’. In the run-up to the 2013 local elections, for example, LDK functionaries 
traveled to Switzerland seeking to engage diaspora members to become local councilors 
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in the Gjiakova region. Diaspora members went to Gjiakova during the summer to 
explore such opportunities. There are diaspora members in LDK’s general council, 
convention, and professional committees. They are actively engaged, although not in 
first-hand decision-making positions, ‘because of the distance’, and ‘because to be a 
head of council requires working at least 8 hours a day’. Diaspora activists are usually 
employed in jobs that tie them to a place, so they can travel only irregularly or for 
longer periods during the summer (R13, 2013).   
Another way to engage constituencies abroad is through the LDK youth 
movement, maintained for over two decades as an important party structure. Another 
LDK official explains specifically targeting students in the 21-27 age range, because 
‘Kosovo has a very young population’. They become engaged through offline forums, 
such as a congress conducted in Berlin in 2013, and meetings throughout Europe at 
least three times a year. Other ways to get involved include online activism and social 
media, whose biggest asset is ‘sharing information in real time’ (R14, 2013).14 The party 
clearly targets students, but there is no indication it seeks nonstudent diaspora youth. 
LDK’s party-building diaspora outreach has shown little concern with further 
promotion of state recognition. Party functionaries say Kosovo has been considered a 
state since 2008, and it is up to present institutions to lobby for further international 
recognition. Statehood can nevertheless be commemorated as a party principle, such as 
memorialization events on the date of President Rugova’s (R1, 2013), or visiting his 
grave when traveling to Kosovo, and meeting families of LDK activists who died during 
the war (R13, 2013). Using the party-building approach, the LDK lobbies with the 
European People’s Party, where the ‘diaspora has put a lot of work’, not least because 
the LDK is reportedly the ‘only party to be part of the European Parliament’s group, 
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which makes a crucial difference for the state’ (R13, 2013).  
By contrast to the LDK, in Kosovo’s institutional development, the Vetevendosje 
(Self-determination) movement emerged out of systemic opposition. A leader of the 
1996 student demonstrations, Alban Kurti made a name for himself as a daring 
charismatic personality with capacity to motivate and organize others. In contrast to the 
oscillating ideological messages of other parties, his messages did not change much over 
time. He stood for self-determination from both Serbia (domestic sovereignty) and 
external governance (international sovereignty), a stance that continues, somewhat 
softened at present. Even after independence, his party activities remained with one 
foot protesting in the street, the other seeking institutional engagement. In 2010, 
Vetevendosje took for the first time part in elections (Balkan Insight, 14/06/2010). 
In contrast to the KLA or LDK, Vetevendosje did not have established diaspora 
networks and organizations during the war or the immediate aftermath. Network 
building began in the mid-2000s, developing more momentum and followers. They 
fostered strong connections with the diaspora in Belgium and Switzerland, where the 
‘diaspora is concentrated and easy to engage’, although Kurti travels regularly to 
Germany and the UK, among other destinations (R1, 2013). With its antisystemic, 
anticorruption message, Vetevendosje managed to attract high profile individuals,  such 
as former KLA fundraiser Florin Krasniqi from the US, or the sculptor of the Kosovo 
Newborn statue, Fisnik Ismaili from the UK (R15, 2013).15 At the time of my fieldwork, 
party leadership had well-educated people who had returned from various European 
countries to seek change they did not envisage through existing parties. Nor did they 
blame the diaspora for not wanting to invest in Kosovo, given ‘these corrupt elites’, or 
to become ‘part of this organized crime network’ (R1, 2013). A high-ranking party 
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official claimed:  
‘The lack of interest in investment is mainly because these people [the diaspora] 
are excluded entirely from decision-making in Kosovo. Our diaspora has not been given 
rights officially. A law gave them the right to vote, but it has been made impossible to 
do so in practice…. That is why Vetevendosje is seeking to get reserved seats [for special 
representation] for the diaspora in the legislature. Diaspora feels they have been used, 
before and during the war, as they made the war possible. When you speak with them 
today, they do not see themselves as part of [Kosovo’s] society, as they do not participate 
in decision-making’ (R1, 2013).  
As a party with anti-establishment characteristics, Vetevendosje advanced a state-
challenging approach, including a vision of the state drastically contrasting with those of 
other parties, even those in opposition. Vetevendosje openly advocated unification with 
Albania as a kin-state, challenging constitutional provisions and opening the way for 
further unification with Albanian populations in neighboring countries (R1, 2013). In 
the view of its leadership (R1, 2013; R16, 2013; R17, 2013),16 unification is desired by 
the population according to surveys and popular sentiments, and needs to take place 
before European integration. This view also challenges the current vision of the 
government to facilitate creation of a larger Albanian space, built on networks of 
business and cultural cooperation, to eventually become part of the European family. 
The diaspora needs to be engaged on the issue of unification, not least because it is in 
the diaspora that all Albanians from Balkan territories live together. This view 
demonstrates nationalist rather than civic engagement. 
Vetevendosje’s anti-establishment message is also visible in how Kosovo’s 
relations with Serbia relate to the diaspora. Diaspora networks were ‘mobilized to 
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protest outside the EU institutions in Brussels, when the agreement with Serbia was 
due, and dialogue was happening. The diaspora was instructed to send letters to their 
governments and the EU’ (R1, 2013). A diaspora businessman with links to 
Vetevendosje, who wanted to invest in Kosovo, complained that authorities were 
preoccupied with negotiations with Serbia, with no time to create a conducive 
environment for diaspora investment (R18, 2013). 17 
 
Conclusions 
There is a need to build theory about under-researched, important political 
phenomena: how agents within sending states engage their diasporas abroad, specifically 
how policies of parties differ from within a postconflict polity with contested statehood.  
Numerous postconflict polities challenged in their domestic or international 
sovereignty exist in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Africa, and Asia as result of 
disintegration of empires and post-colonialism. These polities are themselves subject to 
international disagreements and conflicting claims with their neighbours, thus linking 
national and international struggles within and between territories.  Yet, it is very little 
known about how different parties within these sending states engage their diasporas 
abroad. This article offers a pioneering endeavor for future research in several ways. 
First, it builds a bridge between two literatures that have not been in 
conversation: the growing scholarship on how states reach out to diasporas abroad, 
which has considered very little how agents within states do so; and scholarship on 
diasporas, conflicts, and postconflict reconstruction, focused on diasporas as non-state 
actors, but not addressing the role of the sending state. Considering the postconflict 
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sending state as a separate category could provide more fine-tuning of current 
arguments than scholarship discussing such polities on par with those enjoying full 
sovereignty and no recent history of violence.  
Second, it demonstrates that even in a small de facto state, such as Kosovo, 
diaspora-oriented activities of different parties can be quite diverse in advancing visions 
of the relationship between nation and state. State-endorsing, state-challenging, and party-
building approaches are pursued in active and passive ways. Such conceptualizations 
could easily ‘travel’ to analyze diaspora engagement from other postconflict polities, 
where state identity is volatile or institutions questioned. In Macedonia, for example, 
the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party, actively involved in the 2001 internal warfare 
with factions of the Albanian minority, has governed since 2006 until 2017 and 
managed to effectively capture the state for over a decade. It has been strongly 
interconnected with a highly nationalist diaspora, especially in Australia (author 2010). 
Its state-endorsing outreach has been hostile to multiculturalism internally and 
reconciliation with neighbors externally. Social democrats in Macedonia are much less 
connected to the diaspora or such exclusivist views. In another example, the current 
Armenian government is much more diaspora-oriented (Ministry of Diaspora of the 
Republic of Armenia, 2017) than the government of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war 
(1991-1994). But there are differences in its state-endorsement approach regarding the 
Armenians-dominated Nagorno-Karabakh de facto state compared to the Armenian 
Revolutionary Front party (Dashnaks). The government endorses Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Artsakh in Armenian) as part of the Armenian national identity (Ministry of Diaspora 
of the Republic of Armenia 2017); the ARF party has a more state-challenging 
approach, considering specifically stalled peace-talks. A Dashnak-sympathizing author 
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put it: ‘while some are pushing the Azerbaijan-endorsed path to peace, which is 
handing back liberated territories in exchange for ‘peace‘ and ’maybe some autonomy 
later, the ARF has stated…. that Artsakh’s historical borders, including the Azeri-
occupied region of northern Artsakh, are considered non-negotiable parts of the 
Republic of Artsakh… This is… universally adopted by all ARF members around the 
world’ (Kayserian 2017). 
Third, this article puts on the scholarly map the necessity to consider how 
legacies of war in postconflict societies play out in differential parties’ engagement with 
the diaspora. Further empirical research may demonstrate whether the typological 
argument developed from Kosovo data can be directly extrapolated to other 
postconflict polities. On the basis of article it is worth considering in further mid-range 
theorizing whether parties with established credentials in secessionism and warfare 
could behave as parties in fully established states, depending on whether they are in 
government or in opposition, and seeking the diaspora via government channels for 
state-building or electoral competition. Party newcomers on the political horizon, 
experiencing themselves as domestically weak, might seek to establish political 
credentials by engaging the diaspora to endorse or challenge the state. The implications 
would be whether more extreme forms of nationalism and radical activism could be 
expected from parties with legacies of war in a postconflict polity or from parties which 
are newcomers who could seek to ‘outbid’ established parties with their relationship to 
the diaspora. 
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